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Without doubt, the most signih-
cant and ftusttating obsttuction to
securing adequate insurance compen-
sation for consumets dght now is the
stâtutory prohibition against "stack-
ing" of auto insurance coverages.
Legislative amendments to MCA
Section 33-23-203 in 1.997 weie in-
tended to absolutely block any stack-
ing of insurance benefits in motot
vehicle liability policies. Because the
amendments so sevetely cut potential
limits of recovery for auto accident
victims, plaintrffs' counsel have been
ptessing arguments in state district
couïts seeking to avoid the anti-stack-
ing statute's effect or to attack the
statute itself. In at least two instances,
stacking cases were settled after deci-
sion by district judges and before
appeal.
In the Summer 1999 issue of
Trial Trend¡,I wrote an article en-
titled, ""Stacking" in Montana in
1999,'that traced the histoty of the
stacking issue in Montana and dis-
cussed the legal import of the 1.997
amendments. In the Spring 2002
issue, in a column entitled, 'The
Case Against Monta¡na's Arrti-
Stacking Statute,'I collected and
featuted a numbet of argrments that
wete being ptessed ¿tound the state
in favor of stacking and challenging
the anti-stacking statute.
Fortuitously, the stackirig issue
has now arrived at the Montana Su-
preme Courtin the case of llørdy u.
hogtes siu e Sp e cíahy lttsurørce
Comp øny. MTI-A member I(ent
Ducku/orth of Ronan represents Ned
Hardy who suffered a broken neck in
auto accident on December 26,2000.
Hardy was a passenger in a car driven
by his wife, which was stuck by a
vehicle negligently driven by Gary
Marc. Hardy settled with Mart's liabil-
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ity cartier for irs $50,000 liability limit
and then ptessed claims against his
own insutet, Ptogressive, for the
$50,000 limits of Undednsured Mo-
torist covetage on each of his three
vehicles under the policy and fot the
separâte Medical Pay coverage limits
on each. Hardy had paid sepârâte
premiums for each vehicle and for
each coverage.
Ptogressive refused to stack the
coverages fot the three vehicles and
also asserted that no UIM coverage
was available based on its restrictive
definition of an "underinsured mo-
torist" and on an offset provision
tha! together with the definition,
entirely defeated Hardy's UIM covet-
age. Progressive assetted that antd-
stacking ptovisions of Progressive's
policy and the Montana anti-stacking
staflrte, MCA Section 33-23-203,
prohibited the stacking of the cover-
ages. With regard to the UIM cover-
age, Progressive's policy testtictively
requires that an "undetinsured mo-
torist' have limits of liability less
than the lirnits of the insured's UIM
coverage (as opposed to less than the
limits of the UIM insuted's damages).
Finally, the policy ptovided that any
liabiJity limits recovered be subftacted
from any UIM covetage available
thereby making it cettain that the
insured could nevet recover the limits
of UIM shown on the declarations
page.
I(ent Duckwotth sued Progres-
sive in the Federal District Coutt in
Missoula and secuted Judge Molloy's
cettification of the following three
questions to the Montana Supreme
Court:
1) Is the offset provision in
Ptogtessive's policy void in
Montana as against public
policy?
2) Given that the Montana Su-
preme Court has determined
that underinsutance coverâge
is personal and portable, is it
against public policy in Mon-
tanâ to charge separate premi-
ums for underinsurance for
sepârâte vehicles on the same
policy if insureds can only
collect once on that policy?
3) Are insurance policies such as
the one in question here
against public policy in Mon-
tana when they include provi-
sions that defeat coverage for
which the insurer has received
valuable consideration?
I(ent Duckworth invited MTLA
to join in the effott and, because of
the importance of the questions
involved, the MTI-A Amicus Com-
mittee successfully petitioned the
court to enter the case. I(ent wrote a
fine bdef atgurng the fallacy in allov¡-
ing a statute controlling stacking of
motor vehicle coverages to apply to
petsonal and portable coverages like
UIM and Med Pay. He also attacked
the '.illusory" coverage caused by the
UIM definition and offset provisions.
MTI-A member Randy Bishop
and I endeavoted to add arguments
different from I(ent's in the amicus
brief. Hence, Randy reseatched and
wrote the âÍgument on stacking that
challenges the validity of the anti-
stacking stahrte undet four provisions
of the Montana Constitution, and I
wrote the ârguments on the UIM
definition and offset arguments. 'V7e
edited each other's wotk and honed
the arguments until we convinced
ourselves of their impeccable logic
and righteousness. Because of the
importance of Randy's constitutional
stacking ârguments, they are teprinted
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hete in full. In next quarter's column,
I will discuss the issue of the validity
of Ptogressive's restrictive definition
of UIM and its offset, which result in
"illusory" covefage. Here then are the
arguments submitted by amicus
MTI-A challengrng the constitutional-
ity of the anti=stacking statute:
htroúrction
Section 33-23-203 MCA violates
separation of powers, denies equal
protection, and arbitnftly inftinges
upon inalienable dghts.
For 30 years, this court has con-
sistentþ articulated Mont¿na's public
policy prohibiting insurers ftom plac-
ing provisions in insurance policies
that defeat coverâge for which the
insuret has received valuable consid-
eraton. Rttckdaschelu. Støte Fønn
Muhøl AutotnobíIe Insuranûe Cn
(1,997), 285 Mont. 395, 398, 948 P.zd
7 00,7 02. In Døkotø Fìre fnsur-
ønce Comp ø.ny a. Oìe, 1998 N(Í
288, 'lï1134 & 35;291Mont. 486,499-
500, 968 P.2d 11261134-35, this
court labored to give effect to the
1991 version of Section 33-23-203. It
was able to do so because crucial
omissions were found within the
statutory language. Foreshadowing
the issue here, this court differenti-
ated the 1991 statute from the one
now under consideration, observing,
"[u]nlike the 1.997 version of the
statute, the 1991, version applicable
here makes no reference to the num-
ber of premiums paid." Id.
Now, this court is directly con-
fronted with legislative action un-
doubtedly intended, "as a matter of
public policy, to preclude stacking of
uninsured [and underinsured] motor-
ist coverages despite the insured
having paid separate premiums for
such covetages..." Cf, Oíe, vþra.The
United States District Court seeks
this court's opinion, upon frst im-
pressionl, of the apparent conflict
between three decade's judicial ex-
ptession of pubJic policy v¿hich re-
quires stacking, and Section
33-23-203 (1,997), which forbids it.
Amicus curiae MTI-A submits
that the reason this court has so con-
sistently identified and powerfully
endotsed Montana pubJic policy is
that its roots âre deeply imbedded in
multiple, fundamental constitutional
guarantees and protections, each of
which is infringed by Section 33-23-
203. The office of the Attorney
General has been advised of the
constitutional infrmity of Section
33-23-203 and of the present pro-
ceedings. Its Notice of Intent Not to
Participate'is attached as an Appen-
dix tô this brief.
The certified questìons raise, but
do not directly refer to, these statu-
toty and constitutional issues.
Whether the questions certified to
this court are considered broadly as
they have been phrased or reformu-




lated as permitted by Rule 44(d),
M.R.App.P., each cetified question
must ultimatel¡ and unequivocally, be
answered "yes." But, implicit within
the cettified questions is a threshold
issue. Namel¡ is the legislature's
"dictation" of a particulat interpreta-
tion of the language of insurance
âgreements an impetmissible invasion
of the power of "detetmination,"
constitutionally reserved to the judi-
ciary? MTLA respectfully submits
that, once again, the unfortunate
answef is "yes."
Argument of Amircus Curia MTLA
I. Section33-23-2O3M;CAis
C,onstitutionalþkrvalid
1. Section 33-23-203 MCAvio-
lates separation of powets.
a. Judicial Powet Is Constitu-
tìonally Vested Exclusively In
The Judiciaty.
The independence of the judi-
ciary is absolute. Montana Constitation,
Article III, Section 1; Aøicle WI, Section
1 (1972). Stated succinctly, "the legis-
lative branch makes the laws, the
executjve branch carries out the laws,
and the judicial btanch construes and
interptets the laws." Med:ín Myers
Reuocable T?z¿st a. Yelkn stone
County, 2002 NIT 201. 112'1., 2002 WL
31,01,2788.
The hallmatk of judicial powet is
the power to decide and enter judg-
ments carrying judicial determina-
tions into effect. Seubertu. Seubert,
2000 MT 241,301. Mont. 382, 391,
13 P.3d 365,370-71,. The free exer-
cise of discretion, teasoning, and
judgment, without obedience to the
authodty of the executive or legisla-
tive branches of government, is the
charactetistic that differentiates an
independent judiciary from a body
that is merely ministerial. See
Cørlsona. Cíty of Bozema,n,2001
\tl 46, ffi27 -29, 20 P3d 792, 7 97 . rn
Coøte a. Omb olt (1,983), 203 Mont.
488,493,662P.2d 591, 594, this
court, cit-ing Legi¡latiue Control Ouer
ludina/ Rule-Makins: A Problen in
-
Con.çtitutional Reai¡ion (/ 95 8)- 1.07
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1., 31.-32, adopted the
view that,
"[u]ny stâtute which mõves so
fat into this realm of judicial
affasts as to dictate to a judge
how he shall judge ot how he
shall comport himself in judg-
ing ot which seeks to sutround
the act of judging with ham-
pering conditions cleatþ of-
fends the constitutional
scheme of the separation of
powers and v¡ill be held in-
valid."
This court has consistentþ halted
imptopet legislative and executive
incursions into the tealm of judicial
pov/er. Judicial power cannot be
taken away by legislative aciton."
State ex rel. Bennett u. Bonner
(1950), 123 Mont. 414, 429, 21.4 P.2d
747,755. The manner in which cases
shall be decided is soleþ for the judr-
cial branch of government. Coøte a,
Omltolt (1983), 203 Mont. 488,492,
662P.2d 591,, 593. See also llørlcn a.
City of llelcnø (1984), 208 Mont.
45, 49, 67 6 P.2d 1.91., 1.93 and
Ingrøb øm u. Cb ømpíon lñemø-
tí.onøl (L990), 243 Mont. 42, 48-49,
793 P.2d 7 69, 772-73.
b. Judicial Powet Is Unconstitu-
tionally Abridged By Section 33-
23-203.
Interpreting insurance contracts
is a question of law, reserved to the
cowt. See Døgel a. Fartners fnsur-
Ørce Crroup oÍCompønìes (1995),
273 Mont. 402,405,903 P.2d 1.359,
1361. Indeed, it is the legislative
branch that has declared that a court
must decide the construcdon of "stat-
utes and other writings." See Section
26 -'1, -201,, MC A and Wa.dsoa ort b a,
Sta.te of M ontønø (1.99 6), 27 5
Mont. 287, 296,91.1. P2d 1.1.65, 1170.
Despite this constitut-ional and
statutoty norm, Section 33-23-203
declates that "the limits of insutance
coverâge avallable under each part
of the oolicv mu¡Í be determined a¡
þlllzt . . " (emphasis added). The
legislature then goes on to dictate the
precise manrìer by which coverage
provisions must be interpreted and
applied. See Section 33-23-203 (a) þ)
and (c) MCr\. In this manner, Section
33-23-203 provides a "cookbook" fot
insurers intent upon preventing
insureds from obtaining the benefit
of their UIM batgain. What is re-
markable is that this enactment com-
mands this coutt, and all Montana
courts, to follow its '"tecþe" to the
letter. Making mâtters still worse, the
legislature demonstrated its willing-
ness to gtant the insutance industry
power to altet the intetptetive man-
date, while steadfastly denying it to
the coutts, by authorizing insurers to
"specifi cally provide otherwise."
Section 33 -23 -203 (1) MCA.
Section 33-23-203's directive to
interptet legal insttuments in a ptede-
termined manner exceeds the powers
of the legislature and violates our
Constitution's mand¿te that, "No
person or persons charged with the
exetcise of powet propedy belonging
to one branch shall exercise any
po\¡/er ptopedy belonging to either of
the others..." Montana Conúitation,
.Aøicle III, Section 1 (/ 972).
2. Section 33-23-203 MC'\ in-
fringes upon inalienable rights
included within our Declaration
of Rights, Montana Constitation,
Articl€ II ('1972).
a. Section 33-23-203 abridges
fundamental rights to pursue
life's necessities and protect
pfopefty.
The individual's right to pursue
life's necessities is a fundamental
right encompassing all activities and
oppoffunities necessâry to the enjoy-
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ment of this dght. Montana Con¡ilra- 912,30,\.L.R.4th 165. It is under- lege and immunity, however, which
tion, Article II, Section 3 ft972); written, advettised, and sold to secute the 1,997 Legislature granted ittevo-
Wadsworth, swpra,275 Mont. at 299, Iife's essentials: to protect earnings cably to the insutance industry when
91.1. P.2d at 1.172. Thus, the opportu- and earning capacity, to access medi- it amended Sectjon 33-23-203 MCA.
nity to pursue employment is a fun- cal and insututional care, and to pro- Section 33-23-203 ptovides ir:revo-
damental right because earnings and vide food, shelter, clothing, and cable exemption ftom liabiJity for
earning capacity ". . . ptovide income retirement in the event of cata- contractual obligations for which full
for the most basic of life's necessities, strophic injury. As if these truths had value has been demanded, delivered,
such as food, clothing, and shelter. . ., been momentariþ forgotten, the 1997 and accepted in the form of premi-
[and] for many, if not ums. With these enact-
most, . . . their only ! ments, the legislatute
meâns to secuteother a- - -t-r r^ -:-r-¿:. -^ -.-:..:r^-^ ¡^ ^t^^-. effectivelygranted
essentials of modern Special legislative privilege to charge ;;;r. í.."se to ac-
life, including health mOney fOf a pfOdUCt W¡th the fUll cept premiums for
and medical insurance, knOWledge that it need ngt be deliVefed personal and portable
retirement,anddaycate. J _-_rr.. _.._:r^Lr^ L^ Lt^^-- undetinsuredmotorist
Id..Theserightsare is not generally ava¡lable to those coverage,whichit
fundamentalbecause WhO dO bUSineSS ¡n MOntana. knewtheindustryhad
they are of the nâture
that "without which
other constitutionally
no intent-ion to provide.
,\rticle II, Section 31.,
bars such legìslation.
guaranteed rights would have little
meaning."
Møtter of C.H. (1.984),210
Mont. L84, 201., 683 P.zd 931,940.
Inextricably linked with the right to
pursue life's necessities, of coufse, is
the in¿lienable right to protect prop-
er\r. Montana Constitwtion, Artic/e II,
Section 3 (/972).
Insurance is the n¡ethod ofprotect-
ing one's property and ability to pur-
sue life's necessities. Modern society
tecognizes that a lifetime's putsuit of
life's necessities can be wiped out in
an instant by the negligence of an-
other and that temedies are meaning-
less absent the means to obtain
compensation. Undednsured and .
uninsuted mototist insurance is the
sole means of protectìng against the
irresponsible driver who opts to catry
nothing more than minimum auto-
mobile liabiJity insurance coverage
limits or none at all. Like life insur-
ance, UIM and UM insurance is per-
sonal and portable protection.
kwrctt o. Støte Fønn Mutuøl Au-
t omob íln I n s ur øltc e Co. (199 3), 261.
Mont. 386, 389, 862 P.2d 1.1.46, 11.48
andJ acob s on a. Implemetú D e øl-
ers Mutua.llnsuranrce Co. (L982),
196 Mont. 542, 548,640 P.2d 908,
amendments to Section 33-23-203
delegated to the insurance industry
the unbridled power to ptevent
insuteds from enjoying the bene{its
of their personal insurance bargain.
b. Privileges and immunities.
The legislature is prohibited from
making any trevocable grant of
qpecial privileges, franchises, or im-
munities. Montønø Confütation, Article
lI, Secrion 31 . A'fuanchise' is in the
nature of a "special privilege con-
fetred by the goveÍnment on an indi-
vidual which does not belong to the
citDens generally." Glodta. Cíty of
Mís soul.ø (1 948), 121. Mont. 1.7 8,
183, 190 P.2d 545,548. ,\n immunity
is a special exemption from "duties
which the law genetally requfues othet
citizens to oetfotm." Black's l-^aw
Dictionary lrevised 4th ed. 1968). at o.
885.
Law tequires citizens and cotpo-
rations to perfotm theit conttacts.
Special legislative pdvilege to charge
money for a product with the full
knowledge that it need not be deliv-
ered is not generally available to
those who do business in Montana. It
is precisely this sott of special privi-
3. The legislatute's abddgement
of these inahenable rights works
a denial of equal protection.
Both the Montana and United
States constitutions state that, "[n]o
person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the la'ws." Montana Con¡tita-
tion, Article II, Section 4. ''lhe principal
pulpose of the Equal Protection
Clause is to ensute that citizens are
not the subject of arbitrary and dis-
criminate state action." GodJrey u.
Montønø Sta.te Fisb ønd Gøme
Commíssion (1.981), 193 Mont
304,306, 631. P2d 1.265,1.267;
Breuter a. Ski-IiJft, Inc. (1.988),
234 Mont. 1.09, 7 62 P.2d 226. "The
equal protection clause guarantees
that similat individuals will be dealt
with in a similat manner by the gov-
ernment." Butte Communí.ty
Unìon u, Lewis (1986), 219 Mont.
426, 430, 7 1.2 P.zd 1309, 131 1. Equal
protection challenges to legislation are
teviewed under one of three differ-
ent levels of scrutiny. Møtter of
S.I.M. (1,997), 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951
P.2d 1,365,1371. Where, as here, the
legislation in question infringes upon
rights identified as fundamental by
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express inclusion in Âtucle II, this
court employs the most stringent
standard, strict sctutiny. Strict scrutiny
requires the showing of a compelling
state interest undedying the discrimi-
natory action. Wød.sutortb, Jupra
and Døoùs u. Uníon Pøcific
Raí.lroød, Co. (1.997), 282 Mont.
233, 24't ,937 P.zd 27, 31.
It would be futile to attempt to
unable to access the insurance protec-
uon which they putchased for them-
selves.
Asin Døaís, examples make the
point Assume that A and B each
purchase $300,000 of combined
UM/UIM coverage. Each then suf-
fets similat severe, totally disabling
injuries while riding as a passenger in
a car owned by another. The only
that,"coveraqe from one policy. . .
may [not] be added to the covetage
of anothet " lessens the discdmina-
tory impact of Section 33-23-203 ln
any w^y. See Section 33-23-203(3)
MCA. Stated bluntly, the reasoning
that undedies the 1997 amendments
to Section 33-23-203 is inexplicable
in logic, law, or fairness.
The undetþing justìfication for
demonstrate a compelling
state interest that justifies
discriminatory impacts of
the type mandated by
Section 33-23-203.In-
deed, the stâtute cânnot
even pâss muster undet
ra;rional basis analysis. Ç
Døais, upra.InDøuis,
this court sffuck down
Section 25 -2-1,22Q) MCA,
The consumer who insures more
than one automobile, of course,
gets shortchan ged.
such an enactment
may reside in insur-
ance industry con-
cerns ovet the cost
of claims, but con-





results in lower costs
which purported to restrict venue
options availal>Ie to victims of non-
resident corporations . Døtsís, 282
Mont. at 243-45,937 P.2d at 32-34.
Seealso llenry a. Støte Comþensø-
tÍon Insura.nce Fund., 1999 \lff 126,
294 Mont. 448, 458-59 ; 982 P.2d 456,
464 (no rzÍtonal basis for tteating
workers injured over orie wotk shift
differently from workers injuted ovet
two work shifts).
Reasoning identical to that ap-
plied by this court tn Døaìs is apro-
pos, because here, as in Døuís,the
discriminatory impact of the enact-
ment is stunning. Paragraph (1)(a) of
Section 33-23-203 requites this coutt
to "determine" that the limits speci-
fied for the coverage available under
the policy insuring the motor vehicle
involved in the accident constitute the
limit of available coverage. If no
such policy exists, howeveï, p^rà-
graph (1)þ) of Section 33-23-203
mandates that the courts "determirie"
that the "highest limits of coverage"
constitute the "insurance coverâges
avallable." Thus, based solely upon
whether the 'lehicle involved in the
accident" had coverage, an injured
person or famrly may be stuck with
the low limits of that vehicle ¿nd
diffetence is that the car in which A is
riding carries $25,000 UIM limits,
while the car catryingB is uninsured.
Pursuant to the legislatrve mandate
of Section 33-23-203(1)(a) and þ),
Montana's courts are ditected to de-
termine that A is precluded from
obtaining the $300,000 benefit of the
coverâge purchased, while B is not.
Moreoveq pursuant to Section
33-23-203(1)(c), this court is ordered
by the legislature to disregard the
insured's fund¿mental rights dis-
cussed above and discriminate in
favor of those who purchase UM/
UIM coverage for one vehicle. The
statute declares that this savrry con-
sumer gets the full benefit of the
bargain. One premium is paid, one
coverage is obtained. The consumer
who insures more than one âutomo-
bile, of course, gets shortchanged.
Multiple premiums are paid, but still,
just one coverage is obtarned.
Discrimination such as this is
indistinguishable ftom the "one work
shift" versus "two work shifts" dis-
tinction declared ttrational tn II enry
and the limited venue restrictions
sttuck down in Døuís. And, regard-
less of legislative notions to the con-
ft^ty, no amount of written notice
and has repeatedly disallowed dis-
crimination merely for the sake of
"flscal health." Ilenry, saþra,294
Mont. at 459,982P.2d at 464;
Ileíslera. Ilìnes Motor Co. (1.997),
282Mont. 270,283,937 P.zd 45, 52.
Flere, as tn lleisler and lfenry,there
is no ration¿l reason - let alone the
required compelling state interest - to
explain why similatly situated people
should be treated differently so âs to
deprive one, but not the other, of
either their insurance premiums or
the benefits of theit personal insur-
ance coverage purchased, paid fot
and accepted by the insurer.
4. The legislature's abridgement
of these inalienable rights vio-
lates substantive due process.
"No petson shall be denied of
hfe, liberry, or property without due
process of law." Montana Constìtution,
Aîticle II, Sution /7 (/972). This guar-
antee of due process not only im-
poses standards of fairness in
governmental procedures, but also
contains a substantive component.
Neuaílle a. Sta.te Dept of Fømùþ
Seruûces (1,994), 267 Mont. 237, 249,
883 P.2d 793, 800. Substantive due
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process prevents the state from using
its power to take unreasonable, atbi-
ttaty, or capricious action. To satisfy
substantive due ptocess concerns, "a
statute enacted by the legislature must
be reasonably telated to a permissible
legislative objective." Plumb o.
F ourt b ju dící øl Di s trìct (199 6), 27 9
Mont. 363,372,927 P.2d 1.011, 1.01.6,
cittng Neoaaíllc,883P.2d at 803.
At a minimum, it is diffìcult to
isolate the "petmissible legislative
objective" that undedies legislation
authorizing the insurance industty to
sell illusory coverage. If lowet insur-
ance cost for consumers is the goal,
then how can one atgue that legisla-
tion that authotizes insutets to charge
multiple premiums for a single cover-
age be seen as "reasonably related" to
that end? If, instead, we assume that
increased insutance industry profit is
the goal, then the question becomes,
is this a proper legislative objective in
the first instance ot is it instead a
legislative gtant of special privìlege?
Even assumìng one finds a way
to conclude that increased profit for
insuters is a petmissible objective, is
delegation of the power to sell illu-
sory insurance coverage reasonable ot
arbirrary? To ask these questions is to
ânswer them. Suffice it to sa¡ it is
not easy to raltonahze a legislatìve
strategy that authorizes insutets to
chatge for covetage they do not in-
tend to provide, particulatly when
one commences the inquiry with the
undetstanding that insurance con-
tracts have long been identified as
contracts of adhesion. Transanrcrìcø
Insurarrce C-omþøqt u. Rayle
(1,983),202 Mont. 173,'181., 656 P.zd
820,825 and Fitzgerøld. u. Aetnø
fnsurøtrce Comp øny (197 8), 17 6
Mont. 1.86,'1.9'l.., 577 P.2d 370,373.
Since it goes without saying that
to chatge ptemium under a contrâct
of adhesion with no intention of
providing coverage is unconscio-
nable, one is left v¡ith the statk teal-
iza:j.on that the legislative branch has
granted the insurance industry catte
blanc to sell a product that,'tn any
other citcumstarìce, would be void
and wholly unenforceable. Legislative
actions mote atbitraty, inexplicable,
and unreasonable than this ate rarely
seen. t
1. Neither pubÌic policy considerations
nor the validity of Seclion 33-23-203
(1997) were considered in Cbristensen
o. M outtt øín We st Farnt Bure øu
In sur ønc e Comþ øny, 2000 MT 37 8,
22P.3d 624, or cotld have been. There,
the plaintiff sought to stack liability
coverâges, not personâl and portable
UM/UIM coverages. None of the
public policy and constitutional con-
ccrns central to the present inquiry
were implicated in Cbrìstensen.'lhe
questions certihed by the Honotable
Donald W Molloy present these issues
fo¡ consideration against the backdrop
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